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Abstract 
 
During the Great Moderation, borrowing by the U.S. nonfinancial sector structurally exceeded 
GDP growth. Using flow-of-fund data, we test the hypothesis that this measure of debt buildup 
was leading to lower output volatility. We estimate univariate GARCH models in order to obtain 
estimates for the volatility of output growth. We use this obtained volatility in a VAR model 
with excess credit growth and control variables (interest rate and inflation) over two periods, 
1954-1978 (before the Great Moderation) and 1984-2008 (during the Great Moderation). We so 
test whether the relation between excess credit growth and GDP volatility changed between the 
two periods, controlling for the stance of monetary policy, for inflation, and for the endogeneity 
of credit to growth (as well as for other endogeneities). Results from Granger causality tests, 
impulse response functions and forecast error variance decompositions suggest that changes in 
our ‘excess credit growth’ measure of debt in the nonfinancial sector were among the causal 
factors of the decline in output volatility during the Great Moderation. We discuss implications. 
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DEBT AND THE U.S. GREAT MODERATION 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the mid-1980s, two shifts occurred in the US economy. The first was that macroeconomic 
volatility declined strongly within a few years. This ‘Great Moderation’ lasted for more than two 
decades, until the Great Crash of 2007. The second was that borrowing by the real sector 
increased strongly within a few years, to a level that was structurally above the level of growth. 
It remained high for over two decades, until the Great Crash of 2007. Access to credit may 
decrease output fluctuations since “credit demand appears to contain a significant countercyclical 
component, which arises from the desire of households and firms to smooth the impact of 
cyclical variations in income on spending or production” (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995:44). 
In this paper we pursue this explanation, focusing specifically on the level of indebtedness in 
the real sector. We use the ‘Z’ tables on the U.S. flow of funds to observe borrowing by the real 
sector in excess of growth. We so obtain a measure for the growth in debt held by the real sector 
at the macro level, which we link to output volatility at the macro level. We hypothesize that the 
growth in debt in the real sector was among the causal factors of the lower volatility of output 
during the Great Moderation. Our hypothesis is related to a number of financial-sector 
explanations of the Great Moderation, and consistent with a wider literature on credit and macro 
volatility. But we break new ground in two areas. 
First, no study to date has directly analyzed the link between output volatility during the 
Great Moderation and borrowing by the real sector - that is, excluding borrowing for investment 
in the ‘finance, insurance and real estate’ sectors (or ’FIRE’ sectors, in the classification of the 
National Income and Product Accounts). A number of studies have focused on FIRE-sector 
wealth buildup resulting from financial innovations and its possible effect on output 
moderations, through a wealth effect on income (e.g. Den Haan and Sterk, 2011). The channel 
through which debt-financed wealth accumulation affects output volatility is different from the 
effect of debt-financed activity, which we analyze. 
A second contribution is that we observe not just credit flows (as other studies do), but the 
growth in borrowing by the real sector in excess of output growth. We so focus on the growth in 
the debt-to-GDP ratio that is due to borrowing by the real sector. This goes beyond simply 
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testing for the effect of credit on volatility. Other studies have shown that credit flows to the real 
sector normally move together with output growth (Board, 2012), and that credit moderates 
industrial output volatility (Larrain, 2006). To show that this occurred also during the Great 
Moderation would not be a test of our hypothesis, but rather confirmation that credit to the real 
sector was smoothing output growth, as it normally does. But a special feature of the Great 
Moderation was that growth in credit flows to the real sector structurally exceeded nominal GDP 
growth (as we show in the next section) -  even when excluding the growth in credit to finance, 
insurance and real estate (i.e. not to the real sector), where most of the credit growth was 
occurring. Plausibly, credit growth in the real sector has a more direct impact on real-sector 
volatility. We therefore test whether real-sector credit growth in excess of GDP growth was 
causally linked to the lower volatility of output during the Great Moderation. This has not been 
analyzed to date. 
Our empirical approach is to first estimate the conditional standard deviation of output 
growth. Using this obtained measure for output volatility, we then estimate a number of reduced-
form VAR models for two subsamples with quarterly data, 1954Q3-1978Q4 (before the Great 
Moderation) and 1984Q1-2008Q1 (during the Great Moderation, which ended in 2008, as 
Barnett and Chauvet (forthcoming) and Bean (2011) argue). We examine lags of excess credit 
growth in this system of equations, including (obtained) real output growth volatility, the 
inflation rate and the federal funds rate. We find robust evidence that the increased growth of 
borrowing beyond GDP growth was a causal factor in the greater macroeconomic tranquility that 
characterized the Great Moderation.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents in more detail the argument that 
real-sector credit growth in excess of GDP growth was causally linked to the lower volatility of 
output during the Great Moderation. We also explore trends in bank credit and in growth, 
consistent with the argument. In section 3 we make connections to the literature. In section 4 we 
present the methodology. Section 5 presents the data and reports the results from the analysis. 
Section 6 concludes with a summary, reflections and suggestions for future research. 
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2. Argument and Empirical Trends 
 
The Great Moderation era saw declines in the volatility of a number of macroeconomic variables 
in the U.S., as in many other countries (Bernanke, 2004; Cecchetti et al., 2006; Ćorić, 2012). The 
standard deviation of U.S. quarterly growth and inflation declined by half and by two thirds since 
1984, respectively (Blanchard and Simon, 2001). Stock and Watson (2002) find that the standard 
deviation of U.S. GDP growth declined from 2.6-2.7% in the 1970s and 1980s to 1.5% in the 
1990s. Also employment volatility strongly declined (Kim and Nelson, 1999; Warnock and 
Warnock, 2000). In this paper we focus on the decline in output volatility and hypothesize that 
the increase in borrowing by the nonfinancial sectors lowered volatility during the Great 
Moderation, in contrast to earlier years. 
In Figure 1 we show the long-term development of the growth in bank credit in the U.S.  
The stock of bank loans relative to GDP quadrupled from 1952 to 2008, with most of that growth 
occurring during the Great Moderation, and with credit flows to the finance, insurance and real 
estate sectors accounting for most of the increase. By the end of the Great Moderation, bank 
credit to the “FIRE” sectors had increased from 30% of GDP in 1952 (the start of the data series) 
to 81% of GDP in 1984, to 260% of GDP in 2008. Most of this rise, in turn, was due to growth in 
mortgage debt. After the Great Moderation, FIRE-sector debt dropped sharply relative to GDP. 
 
[Figure 1 HERE] 
 
Much has been written on the role of mortgage debt in U.S. macro dynamics, including the Great 
Moderation puzzle. Our focus is different. For also bank credit to the nonfinancial sectors (that 
is, credit to nonfinancial business, to government and nonmortgage credit to households) rose 
strongly during the Great Moderation: from 87% of GDP in 1952 to 99% in 1984 and to 143% of 
GDP in 2008 (Figure 1). This implies a more than threefold rise in the annual growth rate of the 
(real-sector) credit-to-GDP ratio, from 0.4% in 1952-1983 to 1.4% annually over 1984-2008.1 
We show this in Figure 2 below, which plots the growth in credit to the nonfinancial sectors and 
the growth in nominal GDP.2 We also compute the difference between the two growth rates and 
                                                          
1
 Note that this is different from the total-credit-to-GDP ratio, which rose even faster. 
2
 See the Appendix for data construction details. 
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label this variable “excess credit growth”. 3 The underlying relation is that growth of credit to the 
nonfinancial sector leads to proportionate growth in levels of both debt and activity, so that the 
credit/GDP ratio is stable and excess credit growth moves around zero. This is apparent in the 
horizontal part of the graph in Figure 1 on the left, before the Great Moderation. The growth in 
nonfinancial sector borrowing (bank credit) creates purchasing power which adds proportionally 
to GDP, if expended on domestic goods and services and not on net financial asset acquisition 
(which is ruled out from our data definition). Growth in bank credit to the nonfinancial sectors is 
so the financial counterpart of growth in transactions of goods and services. As Caporale and 
Howells (2001) note, “loans cause deposits and those deposits cause an expansion of GDP 
transactions” – at least, to the extent that loans and the deposits they create are used for 
transactions in goods and services rather than asset transactions (that is why we excluded from 
the definition of exces credit growth “FIRE” sector debt, which captures the bulk of debt that 
finances asset transactions). We so focus on the degree to which activity (not wealth 
accumulation, or asset price increases) was debt-financed. 
This releationship between credit and growth, which has been amply documented (see 
Levine (2004) and Ang (2008) for overviews), is one reason why movements in nominal GDP 
and movements in credit to the real sector are so closely linked.  It is because, as explained by 
Minsky (1982:6), “over a period during which economic growth takes place, at least some 
sectors finance a part of their spending by emitting debt…”.  Empirically, the Federal Reserve 
observes in its ‘Guide to the Flow of Funds’ that “over long periods of time there has been a 
fairly close relationship between the growth of debt of the nonfinancial sectors and aggregate 
economic activity” (Board, 2012:76). Figure 2 shows that the growth in the stock of credit to the 
nonfinancial sectors indeed closely tracks the growth in nominal GDP from the start of the time 
series in the early 1950s until about 1984, but not during the Great Moderation. 
 
[Figure 2 HERE] 
 
In most quarters during the Great Moderation, the growth in the stock of credit to the 
nonfinancial sectors exceeds the growth in nominal GDP, sometimes substantially. The 
difference indicates borrowing which is (by definition) not itself expended on domestic goods 
                                                          
3
 Since we focus on debt financed by bank credit, not debt financed by government bonds, we study the private 
deficits counterpart, not public debt and deficit. 
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and services - if it was, this would have raised GDP growth to the level of credit growth. In order 
to bring out how this differed from the pre-Great Moderation years, in Figure 2 we plot the 
cumulative difference between the growth rates of nominal GDP and credit to the nonfinancial 
sectors. This “excess credit growth” stock was mostly negative between 1952 and 1970, when 
the economy was growing faster, on average, than the growth of lending to the real sector. 
Through the 1970s cumulative “excess credit growth” remained at a positive but fairly constant 
and low level. It took off in the early 1980s and remained high (and increasing in most years) 
during the Great Moderation. 
 
[Figure 3 HERE] 
 
There are several possible channels through which the real sector’s debt growth can temporarily 
rise above GDP growth, and so deviate from the long-term parity noted in Board (2012:176). We 
discuss two channels here and test a reduced form hypothesis below. One channel is debt-
financed net financial asset acquisition by the real sector. Every dollar borrowed and spent on 
assets rather than on goods and services increases debt and financial wealth but not activity, in 
the first instance. Our measure aims to exclude most of this by excluding the statistical categories 
of “FIRE” sector credit flows, which finance financial and real estate transactions rather than 
real-sector activity. But interfering with statistical classifications, there is extensive evidence that 
during the Great Moderation nonfinancial firms increasingly realized their returns in financial 
transactions (e.g. Krippner, 2005). For instance, nonfinancial firms borrowed to finance stock 
repurchases realizing capital gains and subsequently finance consumption or investment out of 
this debt-financed wealth.4 If this occurs in countercyclical manner, this might stabilize GDP. 
This ‘wealth effect’ has been estimated for home equity withdrawal and consumption 
(Greenspan and Kennedy, 2008) supported by mortgage growth, which may also have 
contributed to stability during the Great Moderation (Grydaki and Bezemer, 2013). This is 
excluded from our statistical measure for excess credit growth, but other borrowing by 
                                                          
4
 Lazonick (2011) presents data on 373 companies in the S&P 500 Index in January 2008 that were publicly listed in 
1990. He shows that they expended an annual average of $106.3 billion (or $285 million per company) on stock 
repurchases in 1995-1999, up from $25.9 billion in repurchases (or $69 million per company). This was equal to 
44% of their combined net income (up from 23 percent of their combined net income in 1990-1994). Combined, the 
500 companies in the S&P 500 Index in January 2008 repurchased $489 billion of their own stock in 2006, 
representing 62 percent of their net income, and $595 billion in 2007, representing 89 percent of their net income. 
Lazonick (2011) also notes the dramatic increase in stock repurchases after 2003, which may be linked to the 
upswing in excess credit after 2003 observable in Figure 3. 
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nonfinancial forms may also have been spent on asset acquisitions (including own stock 
acquisitions). 
Another channel through which ‘excess credit growth’ may contribute to output stability 
is debt-financed spending on imports. This increases both imports and - in the same amount - 
consumption or investment. Since the rise in imports and the rise in consumption or investment 
cancel out in the national income definition, debt-financed spending on import does not directly  
raise GDP but it does increase the debt/GDP ratio. In a second-round effect, because of 
substantial spillover effects of imports on the transport and retail sectors and on activity 
generally (e.g. Acharya and Keller, 2008), debt-financed imports, if countercyclical to the 
business cycle, may induce additional activity that stabilizes GDP.5 
In noting these links of asset acquisition and external balances with excess credit growth, 
nothing is implied about causality. Looser loan standards and low interest rates may have 
induced borrowing and consumption, leading to a rise in imports; or vice versa some external 
shock which decreased external balances may have induced more borrowing. A related paper by 
Fogli and Perri (2006) posits causality from external balances to lower incentives to accumulate 
precautionary savings, and an equilibrium permanent deterioration of external balances, 
consistent with our second channel. Explicitly testing for these causal relations is beset by 
pervasive endogeneities.6  It is not even implied that there is causality between excess bank 
credit flows to the nonfinancial sector and the trade balance at this level: this can also be viewed 
as a macroeconomic identity (the current account deficit equals the capital account surplus). The 
same holds for excess credit growth and net asset acquisition. 
This is why below we test a reduced form of our hypothesis, rather than explicitly testing for 
causality between external balances and excess credit growth, or between net asset acquisition 
and excess credit growth. Both these ways in which excess credit growth is used are likely to 
moderate GDP through second-round impacts. To the extent that variations in activity stimulated 
by excess credit growth (through either or both of these channels) are countercyclical to the 
business cycle, excess credit growth smooths GDP. This is what we will test. 
                                                          
5
 Indeed, we found that during the Great Moderation, trend-corrected excess credit growth correlated negatively with 
trend-corrected growth in the U.S. balance of payments on goods and services over 1984-2007, with a correlation 
coefficient of -.30. We also observed that this was not the case before or after the Great Moderation years, when the 
correlation was positive (correlation coefficient .24 over 1961-1983). Data and analysis are available on request. 
6
 We thank James Kennedy for drawing our attention to this point. 
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Our hypothesis fits in with other studies which linked U.S. growth patterns with the rise in 
private deficits. For instance Godley (1999:1) noted that “during the last seven years … rapid 
growth could come about only as a result of a spectacular rise in private expenditure relative to 
income. This rise has driven the private sector into financial deficit on an unprecedented scale.” 
More specific to the volatiltiy of growth, Davis and Kahn (2008) find that an important part of 
the decline in macro volatility is explained by changes in aggregate volatility in the durable 
goods sector, but without a decline in the uncertainty of incomes. This is understandable if part 
of durable goods consumption was financed with debt, not income. Davis and Kahn (2008) 
ascribe the lower volatility to real-sector supply-side factors such as better supply chain 
management (especially, inventory control) and a shift from employment and production from 
goods to services. Their finding is however also consistent with a supply-side change driven by 
the greater credit availability that was typical of the Great Moderation (as Dynan et al (2006) 
document), which would also have the effect of loosening the link between the dynamics of 
income and consumption. 
 
3. Connections to the Literature 
 
That credit stabilizes output is no new finding. We already noted studies by Bernanke and 
Gertler (1995) on the countercyclical tendency of consumer credit and Larrain (2006) on the 
stabilizing properties of credit with respect to industrial output. Iacoviello (2005) estimates a 
monetary business cycle model with nominal loans and finds that “nominal debt dampens supply 
shocks, stabilizing the economy under interest rate control” (Iacoviello, 2005:739). “Credit 
View” literature (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Bernanke, 1993; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) and 
accelerator models (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Campbell, 2005) theorize how the credit system 
may either amplify or dampen exogenous shocks.  A broader strand of literature connects credit 
conditions to the business cycle and the economy’s volatility (e.g. Bliss and Kaufmann, 2003; 
Mendicino, 2007), making the general point that financial development tends to stabilize growth 
(Easterly et al., 2000). 
It is therefore unsurprising that among the many explanations of the Great Moderation, a 
good number involve the financial sector.7 This is the more relevant because of well documented 
                                                          
7
 Research has identified as possible causes for the Great Moderation better inventory management (McConnell and 
Perez-Quiros, 2000; Kahn et al., 2002; McCarthy and Zakrajsek, 2007), labor market changes and demography 
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financial innovations and deregulations of lending practices and loan markets during the Great 
Moderation, such as relaxed collateral constraints, lower down payments and rates of 
amortization for durable goods purchases on household borrowing (Campbell and Hercowitz, 
2005). Dynan et al. (2006) show empirically the influence of financial innovation on consumer 
spending, housing investment, and business fixed investment. Guerron-Quintana (2009) makes 
the same point theoretically in a model of the demand for money with portfolio adjustments. In a 
simulated version of the model he suggests that the Great Moderation can be partially attributed 
to financial innovations in the late 1970s: when moving toward a more flexible portfolio, the 
model can account for almost one-third of the observed decline in the volatilities of output, 
consumption, and investment. Jermann and Quadrini (2006) similarly show in a general 
equilibrium model how innovations in financial markets can generate a lower volatility of output, 
together with a higher volatility in the financial structure of firms. More specific to the Great 
Moderation years, part of the moderation in output volatility may be due to changing responses 
to monetary shocks (Clarida et al., 2000) and improvements in monetary policy (Bernanke, 2004; 
Lubik and Schorfheide, 2003; Boivin and Giannoni, 2006; Akram and Eitrheim 2008). 
The present paper is consistent with each of these finance-driven and credit-driven accounts 
of the Great Moderation (which operated in conjunction with other, nonfinancial factors, to be 
sure). What it adds is a focus on the growth in indebtedness at the macro level (credit growth in 
excess of GDP growth); and specifically, on growth of debt levels connected to real-sector 
activity rather than to asset and property markets (as in Den Haan and Sterk, 2011). We now 
proceed to assess the testable implication of our hypothesis, namely that causality between 
excess credit growth and volatility of output growth was stronger during the Great Moderation 
than it was before the Great Moderation, such that excess credit growth decreased volatility of 
output growth. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Jaimovic and Siu, 2009), oil shocks (Nakov and Pescatori, 2010), changed responses to those and other shocks 
(Gambetti et al., 2008) or broader factors such as institutions (Acemoglou et al., 2003; Owyang et al. (2007), 
external balances (Fogli and Perri, 2006), the size of the economy (Canning et al., 1998), and development levels 
(Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997; Easterly et al., 1993)- or simply to “good luck” (Ahmed et al., 2002; Cogley and 
Sargent, 2005; Primiceri, 2005; Sims and Zha, 2006; Gambetti et al., 2008; Benati and Surico, 2009). 
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4. Methodology 
 
Modeling Volatility  
 
In the literature, the volatility of economic growth has been measured as the standard deviation 
of economic growth or alternatively, as the conditional variance captured by univariate or 
multivariate GARCH models (Bollerslev, 1986 based on Engle’s (1982) ARCH model; Engle 
and Kroner, 1995).8 To obtain such estimates, we test for the existence of ARCH effects (i.e. 
volatility clustering), which causes volatility levels to correlate positively over time. If there are 
ARCH effects, the (univariate) conditional variance is best estimated in an ARCH(p) model 
(Engle 1982). The conditional mean equation is then: 
        ( )21
1
 0
z
t h t h t t t t
h
y y , | ~ N ,µ ϕ ε ε ψ σ
− −
=
= + +∑                                                                (1) 
where, yt, µ,φh, εt are vectors of the dependent variable, intercept, autoregressive term and the 
innovation vector, respectively, and ψt-1 is the information set at time t-1. Given an estimate for 
the conditional mean, this allows us to obtain the conditional variance in the equation:   
        
2 2
0
1
p
t i t i
i
σ α α ε
−
=
= +∑                                                                                                     (2) 
where 2tσ  is the conditional variance, 0α  the intercept and αi  the ARCH terms of the variance 
equation (with 1,..., ,=i p ). The estimated variance should be positive; therefore we impose 
0 0α >  and 0iα ≥  for 1i ≥ . In addition, since we require long-run stationarity, we impose the 
condition 
1
1.
p
i
i
α
=
<∑ 9 
An improvement upon this basic structure is the more parsimonious GARCH model 
(Bollerslev, 1986), where also the lag structure is flexible. A GARCH(p,q) model accommodates 
autoregressive as well as moving-average components in the heteroskedastic variance. Compared 
to equation (2), the equation for heteroskedastic variance is: 
          
2 2 2
0
1 1
p q
t i t i j t j
i j
σ α α ε β σ
− −
= =
= + +∑ ∑                                                                                 (3) 
                                                          
8
 An analytical survey of multivariate GARCH models is in Bauwens et al. (2006).  
9
 Nelson and Cao (1992) provide analytically the inequality constraints for univariate GARCH models. 
11 
 
where jβ  now denotes the GARCH component parameters, with 0jβ ≥  and 
1 1
1
p q
i j
i j
α β
= =
+ <∑ ∑  
for 1i ≥  and 1j ≥ . 
However, this assumes that the response of volatility to positive and negative shocks is 
symmetric. Because of the squared lagged error term in equation (3), the conditional variance is 
a function of the magnitudes of lagged residuals, but not of their signs. In reality, a negative 
shock (“bad” news) tends to increase volatility more than a positive shock (“good” news) of the 
same magnitude, especially in financial time series. Accounting for this asymmetric responses 
(or ‘leverage effect’), we estimate two asymmetric specifications for the conditional variance, 
which are both widely used. The first is the Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model (Nelson, 
1991) which does not require non-negativity constraints: 
( ) ( ) ( )2 20
1 1 1
q p r
t j t j i t i t i k t k t k
j i k
ln lnσ α β σ α ε σ λ ε σ
− − − − −
= = =
= + + +∑ ∑ ∑                                     (4) 
In equation (4), the conditional variance is in log-linear form. So regardless of the 
magnitude of ( )2tln σ , the implied value of 2tσ  is non-negative. It is therefore possible for the 
coefficients to take negative values. Also, instead of using the value of 2t iε −  as in equation (3) the 
EGARCH model uses the standardized value of t iε − . This allows for a more natural 
interpretation of the size and persistence of shocks (Nelson, 1991). A third advantage of the 
EGARCH model is that it allows for leverage effects, as noted. These effects occur if 0kλ < . 
Another option is to estimate a general form of the Threshold ARCH model (Zakoian, 
1994), namely the Threshold GARCH (or TGARCH) model (Glosten et al., 1993). The 
TGARCH model has an additional term accounting for possible asymmetries. The conditional 
variance is now given by: 
2 2 2 2
0
1 1 1
p q r
t i t i j t j k t k t k
i j k
dσ α α ε β σ γ ε
− − − −
= = =
= + + +∑ ∑ ∑                                                                    (5) 
Here we impose the non-negativity constraints: 0
1 1
0, 0,  0,  and 0.
p r
i j i k
i k
α α β α γ
= =
≥ ≥ ≥ + ≥∑ ∑  
In equation (5), t kd −  is a dummy variable which is equal to one if 0t kε − <  and equal to zero if 
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0t kε − ≥ . This ensures that if 0kγ > , then negative shocks will have larger effects on volatility 
than positive shocks. If 0kγ ≠ , then there is a threshold effect.
 
 
Vector Autoregressive Models and Tests for Causality  
 
Once we have obtained this estimate for output volatility (i.e. the conditional standard deviation), 
we can then move on to the aim of this paper, which is to analyze any causality between output 
volatility and other variables. We do this in a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model where one 
can capture the interdependencies between multiple time series (Sims, 1980). Since we have no 
prior on causality, all variables are treated as endogenous, allowing for the value of a variable to 
depend on its own lags and on the lags of all the other variables in the model. The system of 
equations in a VAR model is: 
         0 1 1 ...− −= Α + Α + + Α +t t p t p ty y y ε                                                                             (6) 
where yt  is an (n x 1) vector with the n variables included in the VAR (endogenous variables), 
A0 reflects an (n x 1) vector of intercept terms, Ai  denote (n x n) matrices of coefficients (with 
i=1,…p) and εt is an (n x 1) vector of error terms. 
Once we obtained estimates of the system of equations (6) we conduct three analyses. First, 
we conduct Granger causality tests. A series xt “Granger-causes” a series yt if changes in xt 
precede changes in yt , so that values of xt improve predictions of yt, but yt does not help predict 
xt (Granger, 1969). A second analysis is to estimate impulse response functions (IRFs), which 
reflect the dynamic relationship between the variables.10 IRFs trace the effect of a 1 standard 
deviation shock to one of the innovations (error terms) on current and future values of the 
endogenous variables. A shock to the ith variable is so transmitted to the other endogenous 
variables in the VAR system (and also, of course, directly affects the ith variable itself). IRFs 
represent the moving average evolution of the system, describing how one variable responds to a 
shock to itself or to any other variables. Sims (1980) notes that examining the IRFs might be the 
most effective way of checking for Granger Causality in multivariate frameworks. Another way 
of characterizing the dynamic behavior of the VAR is to conduct the forecast variance 
decomposition analysis (suggested also by Sims, 1980). 
                                                          
10
 Following Sims (1980), we compute the orthogonalized impulse response, where the underlying shocks are 
orthogonalized using the Cholesky decomposition method. 
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5. Data and Empirical Results 
 
We use quarterly data for the U.S. over two subsamples, 1954Q3-1978Q4 (before the Great 
Moderation) and 1984Q1-2008Q1 (during the Great Moderation).11 The data construction for 
three of the four variables we use follows Den Haan and Sterk (2011).12 We calculated the 
logarithm of real GDP (RGDP) and as control variables we include the Federal funds rates (FR) 
– which is stationary in first difference (I(1)) - and inflation (INF), measured by the real GDP 
deflator.13 Our fourth variable is excess credit growth (EXCRED) - the difference between the 
growth rates of credit to the real sector and of nominal output – which is stationary at its level. 
We refer to the Appendix for details of the construction of EXCRED. With these four variables 
in a VAR framework, we control for the stance of monetary policy, for inflation, and for the 
endogeneity of credit to growth (as well as for other endogeneities).  
After testing for the stationarity, we examine the presence of ARCH effects (clustered 
volatility) by conducting the ARCH Lagrange Multiplier (ARCH-LM) test, for 1 to 12 lags 
(Engle, 1982). Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and values of the ARCH-LM statistic for the 
two subsamples. 
 
[Table 1 HERE] 
 
All variables have positive growth rates (differenced logs) on average. All variables tend to be 
more volatile before the beginning of the Great Moderation than during the Great Moderation. 
The distribution of inflation exhibits positive skewness with few high values in both subsamples; 
the opposite holds for the remaining variables. Further, the kurtosis (or “peakedness”) statistics 
                                                          
11
 We applied the Chow test for structural breaks over the whole period 1954Q3-2008Q1 and found that any quarter 
in 1980Q1-1983Q4 is a potential breakpoint in output volatility. This is consistent with Boivin and Giannoni (2006) 
who report that there is no robust breakpoint at which the Great Moderation would have started. Fang and Miller 
(2008) show that the time-varying variance of output falls sharply or even disappears once they incorporate a one-
time structural break in the unconditional variance of output starting 1982 or 1984. The literature uses any year 
between the late 1970s and 1984 at the latest. To test sensitivity to choice of break point, we chose 1981Q2 as 
alternative breakpoint and we re-estimated the VAR. The results are similar to those obtained for the periods 
1954Q3-1978Q4 and 1984Q1-2008Q1 and are available upon request. 
12
 We thank Wouter den Haan for making these data available, at http://www.wouterdenhaan.com/data.htm#papers.  
13
 We apply the following stationarity tests to the logs of the variables: (i) Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin 
(KPSS) (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992), (ii) Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and (iii) Phillips 
and Perron (PP) (Phillips and Perron, 1988). For tests (i) and (iii), the lag length was selected by the kernel-based 
estimator of the frequency zero spectrum, which is based on a weighted sum of the covariances. For test (ii) the 
selection of the number of lags in the test equations is according to the Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC). The 
stationarity is tested at 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels and the time trend has been taken into account in the test 
equation. The unit root test results are avaialable on request. 
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for the distributions of all the variables show more deviations from the normal distribution in the 
first subsample than in the second. Finally, the ARCH-LM test shows that there is evidence of 
ARCH effects in the squares of real output growth rate in both subsamples.14  
We then capture the conditional standard deviation of RGDP estimating four alternative 
GARCH models, symmetric and asymmetric (equations (1)-(5)), accounting for autoregressive 
terms. Given the skewness and kurtosis of the log difference of RGDP, we assume that the error 
term of equation (1) is t-student distributed. Therefore, the parameters of the univariate GARCH 
models are estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function: 
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( )
2 2
2
2 2
2 2 11 1log log log 1
2 2 2 21 2
t
t t
t
v v
l
vv
pi ν ε
σ
σ
   
− Γ +
 = − − − +    −Γ +   
                             (7) 
where Γ(.) is the gamma function and v is the degree of freedom (v>2). The log-likelihood 
function for the conditional t distribution converges to the log-likehood function of the 
conditional normal GARCH model as v → ∞ . 
We first select the model which meets the non-negativity constraints of the coefficients and 
the stationarity condition (symmetric GARCH models), and/or the model which supports the 
existence of leverage or threshold effect (asymmetric GARCH models). From this subset, the 
preferred GARCH model is selected according to the minimum value of the Schwarz 
Information Criterion (SIC). The conditional variance of output growth is captured by a 
symmetric GARCH model - specifically, an AR(1)-GARCH(1,1).15 The conditional mean and 
variance equations are as follows: 
 
( ) ( )
[ ] [ ]
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0 0007    0 0707
0 0000     0 0000
t t tdlrgdp . ( . )dlrgdp
. .
. .
ε
−
= + +
                                                                            (8a) 
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[ ] [ ] [ ]
2 2 2
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 1 73 06  0 0570         0 0589
 0 3552         0 0429         0 0000
t t t. E . .
. E . .
. . .
σ ε σ
− −
= − + +
−
                                                                     (8b)
 
 
                                                          
14
 We only test for ARCH effects in GDP growth as we are interested in its volatility and not in the volatility of the 
other variables. 
15
 We used 1-12 lags for the estimation of the AR(p)-(A)Symmetric GARCH models. Several conditional variance 
specifications have been estimated and the GARCH(1,1) performs better. 
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where figures in parentheses and square brackets reflect standard errors and probability values, 
respectively. The Lung-Box statistic indicates that the estimated model is well-specified once it 
does not suffer from remaining autocorrelation (Q(p)) and remaining ARCH effects (Q2(p)).16 
We estimate a number of reduced-form VAR models on quarterly data for the two 
subsamples (1954Q3-1978Q4, before the Great Moderation and 1984Q1-2008Q1, during the 
Great Moderation). We examine whether lags of excess credit growth (EXCRED) matter to the 
volatility of real output growth (denoted σdlrgdp), which was estimated as the conditional standard 
deviations obtained in equations (8a) and (8b). In addition to the obtained volatility of real output 
growth σdlrgdp (which is stationary), other variables in the system are the inflation rate (INF) and 
the federal funds rates (FR). We estimate VAR(p) models with p=1,…12. The model selection 
criterion is again the minimum SIC value. This procedure yields a VAR(1) model for both 
subsamples.17 To examine the causal effects of the variables under investigation, we conduct 
Granger Causality tests, reported in Table 2.  
 
[Table 2 HERE] 
 
In Table 2, we detect bidirectional causality between excess credit growth and output volatility in 
the second subsample. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that during the Great 
Moderation, borrowing by the real sector in excess of GDP growth moderated GDP fluctuations. 
Furthermore, we find that output growth volatility was Granger-caused by changes in monetary 
policy (captured in the interest rate) before the Great Moderation, while the opposite direction of 
causality holds during the Great Moderation. Further, we find Granger causality from excess 
credit growth to changes in interest rate in both subsamples. And finally, inflation Granger-
causes changes in the interest rate in the second subsample but not in the first subsample, where 
the direction of causality is reversed. Following Sims (1980), the best way to assess our results is 
in IRF analyses. We do this over 12 periods in Figure 4 and Figure 5, separately for both 
subsamples. 
 
[Figure 4 HERE] 
                                                          
16
 The corresponding values are: Q(8)=10.017, Q(12)=12.927, Q2(8)=9.811, Q2(12)=13.287. 
17
 Although the lag order of the VAR is short, the dynamic behavior of the variables can be captured sufficiently in 
the first subsample. We tried also VAR(2) as indicated by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC); the qualitative 
results do not change. In the second subsample VAR(1) is indicated by both information criteria. 
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[Figure 5 HERE] 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the IRFs before the Great Moderation. They are consistent with the Granger 
causality test results. A one-standard deviation shock to the change of the interest rate impacts 
negatively (but with increasing strength) on output volatility, until the sixth period. A one-
standard deviation shock to the change of the interest rate impacts positively on inflation, with 
decreasing strength. And a one-standard deviation shock to excess credit growth impacts 
positively (with decreasing strength) on the change of the interest rate, until the fourth period.  
The IRFs in Figure 5, during the Great Moderation, are also in line with Granger causality 
tests. There are five significant effects, summarized below. Most relevant to our hypothesis, we 
find that a one-standard deviation shock in excess credit growth impacts negatively (with 
decreasing strength) on output volatility, after the second period. It is interesting to note that 
there is also reverse causality. A one-standard deviation shock in output volatility impacts 
positively on excess credit growth (and the impact is stable), after the second period. This is 
consistent with the view that excess credit growth is induced by concerns over volatility 
concerns. Neither of these causal links between excess credit growth and output volatility were 
observed before the Great Moderation. We summarize all significant IRF findings in Table 3.  
 
[Table 3 HERE] 
 
Results of the forecast error variance decomposition analysis also support the observations from 
Granger causality tests (Figure 6, Figure 7). We summarize the key findings in Table 4.18  
 
[Table 4 HERE] 
 
[Figure 6 HERE] 
 
[Figure 7 HERE] 
 
The forecast error variance decomposition analysis shows that a substantial part of output growth 
volatility during the Great Moderation is explained by excess credit growth, whereas almost 
nothing of it was explained by excess credit growth before the Great Moderation. This supports 
                                                          
18
 The decomposition of the forecast error variance of  inflation and the federal funds rate are not reported in the 
table and the Figures, and are available on request. 
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the hypothesis that the rise in excess credit growth is among the causes of the Great Moderation 
change in volatility. Moreover, the importance of excess credit growth also clearly increased, 
relative to other macro-monetary factors. Inflation and the interest rate both explain substantial 
part of output volatility before the Great Moderation and much less during the Great Moderation, 
while the reverse is true for excess credit growth. In sum, both the IRF results and the forecast 
error variance decomposition analysis indicate causality from excess credit growth to output 
volatility during the Great Moderation (and not before the Great Moderation) such that excess 
credit growth moderated output volatility.  
 
6. Summary, Discussion and Conclusions  
 
In the mid-1980s, two shifts occurred in the US economy. The first was that macroeconomic 
volatility declined strongly within a few years. This ‘Great Moderation’ lasted for more than two 
decades, until the Great Crash of 2007. The second was that borrowing by the real sector 
increased strongly within a few years, to a level that was structurally above the level of growth. 
It remained high for over two decades, until the Great Crash of 2007. Since access to credit may 
decrease output fluctuations, we hypothesize that during the Great Moderation borrowing by the 
real sector in excess of GDP growth moderated GDP fluctuations.  
No study to date has directly analyzed the link between output volatility during the Great 
Moderation and borrowing by the real sector - that is, excluding borrowing for investment in 
financial instruments and assets in the ‘finance, insurance and real estate’ sectors (or ’FIRE’ 
sectors, in the classification of the National Income and Product Accounts). The effect of debt-
financed wealth accumulation on volatility is different from the effect of debt-financed activity, 
which we analyze. A second contribution is that we observe not just credit flows (as most other 
studies do), but the growth in borrowing by the real sector in excess of output growth (or ‘excess 
credit growth’). Using flow-of-fund data, we so focus on the growth in the debt-to-GDP ratio 
that is due to borrowing by the real sector. This is motivated by the theoretical equality in growth 
in borrowing by the nonfinancial sectors and private nominal output growth of private and 
external deficits are zero. We show that excess credit growth was persistently positive during 
most of the Great Moderation, which it was not before. We also explore data and evidence to 
suggest that this ‘excess credit growth’ growth was linked to the fall in external balances and the 
18 
 
rise in financial transactions by the real sector. After the mid 1980s, the nonfinancial sectors 
obtained debt-financed purchasing power (bank credit) which - so we hypothesize - may have 
been used to cushion shocks in the non-debt financed part of nominal GDP. This may run 
through countercyclical variations in imports and through countercyclical wealth effects. 
We test the hypothesis that this “excess credit” was leading to lower output volatility. We 
estimate univariate GARCH models in order to obtain estimates for the volatility of output 
growth. We use this obtained volatility in a VAR model with the volatility of output growth, 
excess credit and control variables (interest rate and inflation) over two periods, 1954-1978 
(before the Great Moderation) and 1984-2008 (during the Great Moderation), We so test whether 
the excess credit-GDP volatility relations changed between the two periods.  Results from 
Granger causality tests, impulse response functions and forecast error variance decompositions 
all suggest that changes in excess credit were causing the decline in output volatility during the 
Great Moderation. The causality is also bidirectional. 
As to the interpretation of these results, a focus on debt growth is one way to connect (as in 
Bean, 2011) the Great Moderation to the (2007) ‘Great Crash’ and the ‘Great Recession’ that 
followed. Bean (2011) discusses how low volatility in real and financial variables induced more 
debt-financed investment and risk taking than would otherwise have occurred in the decades 
preceding the Crash. Kemme and Roy (2012) show that the U.S. mortgage-driven house price 
boom was a good predictor of the crisis. Cross-country empirical results point in the same 
direction. Akram and Eitrheim (2008) find that stabilization, not acceleration of credit growth 
enhances stability in both inflation and output in the long run. Arcand et al. (2012) find that there 
can be ‘too much finance’: above a threshold level of the credit-to-GDP ratio, the growth effect 
of credit declines and turns negative. Cecchetti et al. (2012) likewise conclude that beyond a 
certain level, debt is a drag on growth. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) find that a common 
denominator of financial crisis is a credit boom while Jorda et al. (2012) find that more credit-
intensive expansions tend to be followed by deeper recessions and slower recoveries. Schularick 
and Taylor (2012) also analyze that financial crisis are ’credit booms gone bust’. 
In line with these recent studies, this paper motivates a link between Moderation and Crash: 
perhaps there was a moderation of volatility partly due to immoderate credit growth not only in 
mortgage markets but also in the real sector. In a broader perspective, this more cautionary view 
on credit also fits in with Minsky’s (1982) theory that ‘stability is destabilizing’, precisely 
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because of the buildup in leverage that it encourages. This implies that the causality from ‘excess 
credit’ to declining output volatility that we hypothesize may in fact be bidirectional; and that it 
may be the prelude to financial instability. In the 1999 study already quoted, Godley noted for 
the U.S. that the growth in private spending was structurally larger than the growth in private 
sector incomes since the early 1990s, and he wrote that “if … the growth in net lending and the 
growth in money supply growth were to continue for another eight years, the implied 
indebtedness of the private sector would then be so extremely large that a sensational day of 
reckoning could then be at hand.” (Godley, 1999:5). These observations, linked to the present 
study, may lead to a re-evaluation of the nature of the Great Moderation. 
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Appendix: Data Construction 
 
Given the theoretical relations explained in section 2, the empirical aim is to construct a measure 
for credit which (i) flows to the real sector, and (ii) which finances activity in the real sector. 
Both qualifications are important, since (i) most bank credit flows not to the real sector (but to 
the financial sectors) and (ii) a large part of credit which does flow to the real sector (namely, 
mortgages) does not finance activity but finances transactions in wealth. We exclude both from 
the credit flow in our variable in order to construct a fairly reliable measure for credit which 
finances activity in the real sector. Only then can we proceed to analyse whether the growth rate 
of this credit measure indeed maps onto activity (it does until the mid-1980s), and if it does not, 
whether the difference (‘excess credit growth’) was a causal factor in the greater stability of 
output growth that characterized the Great Moderation. 
We utilize quarterly data from ‘Z’ tables in the Flow of Funds Accounts. The stock of loans 
from banks to the real sector is recorded in series FL394104005.Q in Z1, titled ‘nonfinancial 
sectors credit market instruments; liability’, while credit assets held by the domestic real sector 
are recorded in series FL384004005.Q, titled ‘domestic nonfinancial sectors credit market 
instruments; asset’. The difference is the net flow of bank credit to the real sector. However, this 
includes mortgage credit, which does not directly finance activity but finances transactions in 
wealth. Mortgage credit is recorded in series FL383165005.Q, ‘domestic nonfinancial sectors; 
total mortgages; liability’. Subtracting mortgage credit (FL383165005) from total credit 
(FL394104005) to the real sector give us a proxy for bank credit that directly finances real-sector 
activity. 
Apart from bank credit (‘credit market instruments’), real-sector activity is additionally 
financed by inter-firm trade credit (FL383070005.Q; see Mateut (2005) on the role of trade 
credit), firm-to-customer consumer credit (FL383066005.Q) and ‘other loans and advances’ 
(FL383069005.Q). We add these credit stocks (which are quantitatively small relative to the 
bank credit stock) to our measure. Finally, we subtract net financial investment (including home 
equity withdrawal; Greenspan and Kennedy, 2008). This is our measure for credit flows to the 
real sector. As noted in section 2, this measure is still imperfect due to financial transactions on 
credit in the real sector, such as leveraged mergers and acquisitions and stocks repurchases. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean Std dev. Skewness Kurtosis LM-Statistic 
      
1954Q3-1978Q4      
 
     
      
RGDP 0.0094 0.0109 -0.3512 3.5788 33.1762*** (12) 
      
INF 0.0097 0.0064 0.8570 3.5780 - 
      
EXCRED 0.0042 0.0380 -0.4203 7.5537 - 
      
FR 0.0232 0.1858 -1.1955 9.2076 - 
      
 
     
1984Q1-2008Q1      
 
     
RGDP 0.0076 0.0051 -0.1665 3.2697 3.5213* (1) 
      
INF 0.0063 0.0024 0.6443 2.7108 - 
      
EXCRED 0.0107 0.0352 -0.4955 2.8513 - 
      
FR -0.0133 0.1401 -0.6680 5.9591 - 
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Table 2: Granger Causality Tests 
 
 
Notes: Probability values of the corresponding Chi-square statistics are in parentheses. 
Testable Hypotheses Pre-Great Moderation During-Great Moderation 
   
 Chi-square statistic
 
  
 
 1954Q3-1978Q4 1984Q1-2008Q1 
   
EXCRED does not Granger Cause σdlrgdp 0.1542 
(0.6945) 
4.0361 
(0.0445) 
   
σdlrgdp does not Granger Cause EXCRED 0.0443 
(0.8333) 
4.4536 
(0.0348) 
   
dlfr does not Granger Cause σdlrgdp 8.7985 
(0.0030) 
2.2814 
(0.1309) 
   
σdlrgdp does not Granger Cause dlfr  1.1296 
(0.2879) 
7.1043 
(0.0077) 
   
inf does not Granger Cause σdlrgdp 0.5129 
(0.4739) 
0.3658 
(0.5453) 
   
σdlrgdp does not Granger Cause inf 1.0018 
(0.3169) 
0.4383 
(0.5079) 
   
dlfr does not Granger Cause EXCRED 0.5303 
(0.4665) 
0.2002 
(0.6545) 
   
EXCRED does not Granger Cause dlfr  4.1972 
(0.0405) 
7.9012 
(0.0049) 
   
inf does not Granger Cause EXCRED 0.0064 
(0.9360) 
1.3600 
(0.2435) 
   
EXCRED does not Granger Cause inf 1.2395 
(0.2656) 
1.1919 
(0.2750) 
   
inf does not Granger Cause dlfr 0.6209 
(0.4307) 
5.2001 
(0.0226) 
   
dlfr does not Granger Cause inf 3.5578 
(0.0593) 
0.4183 
(0.5178) 
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Table 3: Excess credit growth moderated output volatility during, but not before the Great 
Moderation 
 
Results from impulse response functions 
Before the Great Moderation During the Great Moderation 
 
 
change in interest rate (-) => output volatility excess credit growth (-) => output volatility 
change in interest rate (+) => inflation output volatility (+) => excess credit growth 
excess credit growth (+) => change in interest rate output volatility (-) => change in interest rate  
 
excess credit growth (+) => change in interest rate 
 
inflation (+) => change in interest rate 
 
Note: In the table, x (-) => y denotes that a one-standard deviation shock in variable x impacts negatively on the change of 
variable y. Similarly, x (+) => y indicates a positive impact.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Excess credit growth explains output volatility during, but not before the Great 
Moderation 
 
% of 12-quarters-ahead forecast error variance 
of output growth volatility explained by ... 
Before the Great Moderation During the Great Moderation 
 
 
excess credit growth:          0.2% excess credit growth:         16.2% 
change in interest rate:      11.4% change in interest rate:        4.2% 
Inflation:                             4.8% Inflation:                             0.6% 
 
 
 
24 
 
Figure 1: U.S. bank-credit-to-GDP ratios (%), 1952Q1 – 2012Q1 
 
 
                 Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, flow of funds data (Z tables). 
 
 
Figure 2: Growth of credit to the nonfinancial sectors and nominal GDP, 1952-2012 (%) 
 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analyis. Note: Data are growth rates (in percent) of nominal Dollar figures. In this graph  
(but not in the analysis below), time series have been smoothed by taking the median of the current, previous and next quarter. 
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Figure 3: Cumulative percentage point growth of “excess credit growth”, 1952-2008 
 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analyis 
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to shocks before the Great Moderation (1954Q3-1978Q4) 
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses to shocks during the Great Moderation (1984Q1-2008Q1) 
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Figure 6: Variance Decompositions before the Great Moderation (1954Q3-1978Q4) 
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Figure 7: Variance Decomposition of the Variables during the Great Moderation (1984Q1-2008Q1) 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Percent SDDLRGDP variance due to SDDLRGDP
   
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Percent SDDLRGDP variance due to EXCRED
 
 
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Percent SDDLRGDP variance due to DLFR
   
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Percent SDDLRGDP variance due to INF
 
 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Percent EXCRED variance due to SDDLRGDP
 
 
30 
 
References 
 
Acemoglou, D. and F. Zilibotti (1997), “Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk,  
Diversification, and Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 105: 709-51. 
 
Acemoglou, D., S. Johnson, J. Robinson and Y. Thaicharoen (2003), “Institutional Causes, 
Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth,” Journal of Monetary Economics 
50: 49-123. 
 
Acharya, R. and W. Keller (2008), “Estimating the Productivity Selection and Technology 
Spillover Effects of Imports,” NBER Working Paper No. 14079. 
 
Ahmed, S., A. Levin and B. Wilson (2002), “Recent U.S. Macroeconomic Stability: Good Luck, 
Good Policies, or Good Practices?,” International Finance Discussion Papers 730, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). 
 
Akram, Q. and O. Eitrheim (2008), “Flexible Inflation Targeting and Financial Stability: Is It 
Enough to Stabilize Inflation and Output?,” Journal of Banking and Finance 32: 1242-54. 
 
Ang, J. (2009), “A Survey of Recent Developments in the Literature of Finance and Growth,” 
Journal of Economic Surveys 22: 536-76. 
 
Arcand, J.L., E. Berkes and U. Panizza (2012), “Too Much Finance?,” IMF Working Paper No. 
161. 
 
Barnett, W. and M. Chauvet (forthcoming), “The End of the Great Moderation? How Better 
Monetary Statistics Could Have Signaled the Systemic Risk Precipitating the Financial 
Crisis,” Journal of Econometrics Annals. 
 
Bauwens, L., S. Laurent and J. Rombouts (2006), “Multivariate GARCH Models: A Survey,” 
Journal of Applied Econometrics 21: 79-109. 
31 
 
 
Bean, C. (2011), “Joseph Schumpeter Lecture: The Great Moderation, the Great Panic, and the 
Great Contraction,” Journal of the European Economic Association 8: 289-325. 
Benati, L. and P. Surico (2009), “VAR Analysis and the Great Moderation,” American Economic 
Review 99: 1636-52. 
 
Bernanke, B. (1993), “Credit in the Macroeconomy,” Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York issue Spr: 50-70. 
 
Bernanke, B. (2004), “The Great Moderation,”  Speech at the meetings of the Eastern Economic 
Association, Washington, D.C., February 20. 
 
Bernanke, B. and A. Blinder (1988), “Credit, Money, and Aggregate Demand,” American 
Economic Review 78: 435-39. 
 
Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler (1995), “Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary 
Policy Transmission,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9: 27-48. 
 
Blanchard, O. and J. Simon (2001), “The Long and Large Decline in U.S. Output Volatility,” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1: 135-74. 
 
Bliss, R. and G. Kaufmann (2003), “Bank Procyclicality, Credit Crunches, and Asymmetric 
Policy Effects: A Unifying Model,” Journal of Applied Finance 13: 23-31. 
 
Board (2012), Flow of Funds Guide at http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/fof/. 
 
Boivin, J., and M. Giannoni (2006), “Has Monetary Policy Become More Effective?,” The 
Review of Economics and Statistics 88: 445-62. 
 
Bollerslev, T. (1986), “Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity,” Journal of 
Econometrics 31: 307-27.  
32 
 
 
Campbell, J. and Z. Hercowitz (2005), “The Role of Collateralized Household Debt in 
Macroeconomic Stabilization,” NBER Working Paper No. 11330. 
 
Campbell, S. (2005), “Stock Market Volatility and the Great Moderation,” FEDS WP, 2005-47, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Canning, D., L.A.N. Amaral, Y. Lee, M. Meyer and H.E. Stanley (1998), “Scaling the Volatility 
of the GDP Growth Rate,” Economics Letters 60: 335-41. 
 
Caporale, G. and P. Howells (2001), “Money, Credit and Spending: Drawing Causal Inferences,” 
Scottish Journal of Economics 48: 547-57. 
 
Cecchetti, S., A. Flores-Lagunes and S. Krause (2006), “Assessing the Sources of Changes in 
Volatility of Real Growth,” NBER Working Paper No. 11946. 
 
Cecchetti, S., M.S. Mohanty and F. Zampolli (2011), “The Real Effects of Debt,” Bank for 
International Settlements Working Paper No. 352. 
 
Clarida, R., J. Gali, and M. Gertler (2000), “Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic 
Stability: Evidence and Some Theory,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115: 147-80.  
 
Cogley, T. and T. Sargent (2005), “Drifts and Volatilities: Monetary Policy and Outcomes in       
the Post-WWII US”, Review of Economic Dynamics 8: 262-302. 
 
Ćorić, B. (2012), “The Global Extent of the Great Moderation,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics 
and Statistics 74: 493 – 509. 
 
Davis S. and J. Kahn (2008), “Interpreting the Great Moderation: Changes in the Volatility of 
Economic Activity at the Macro and Micro Levels,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22: 
155-80.  
 
33 
 
Den Haan, W. and V. Sterk (2011), “The Myth of Financial Innovation and the Great 
Moderation,” The Economic Journal 121: 707-39. 
 
Dickey, D. and W. Fuller (1979), “Distribution of the Estimators of Autoregressive Time Series 
with a Unit Root,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 74: 427-31. 
 
Dynan, K., D. Elmendorf and D. Sichel (2006), “Can Financial Innovation Help to Explain the 
Reduced Volatility of Economic Activity?,” Journal of Monetary Economics 53: 123-50. 
 
Easterly, W., M. Kremer, L. Pritchett and L. Summers (1993), “Good Policy or Good Luck? 
Country Growth Performance and Temporary Shocks,” Journal Of Monetary Economics 
32:459-83. 
 
Easterly, W., R. Islam and J. Stiglitz (2000), “Shaken and Stirred: Explaining Growth 
Volatility,” Paper at the 2000 Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics. 
 
Engle, R. (1982), “Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity with Estimates of the Variance 
of United Kingdom Inflation,” Econometrica 50: 987-1007. 
 
Engle, R. and K. Kroner (1995), “Multivariate Simultaneous Generalized ARCH,” Econometric 
Theory 11: 122-50. 
 
Fang, W. and S. Miller (2008), “The Great Moderation and the Relationship between Output 
Growth and its Volatility,” Southern Economic Journal 74: 819-38. 
 
Fogli, A. and F. Perri (2006), “The "Great Moderation" and the US External Imbalance,” NBER 
Working Paper No. 12708. 
 
Gambetti, L., E. Pappa, and F. Canova (2008), “The Structural Dynamics of US Output and 
Inflation: What Explains the Changes?,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 40: 369–88. 
34 
 
Glosten, L. R., R. Jaganathan, and D. Runkle (1993), “On the Relation between the Expected 
Value and the Volatility of the Normal Excess Return on Stocks,” Journal of Finance 48: 
1779–801. 
 
Godley, W. (1999), “Seven Unsustainable Processes: Medium-Term Prospects and Policies for 
the United States and the World,” Working paper, the Levy Economics Institute, Strategic 
Analysis.  
 
Granger, C. (1969), “Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-spectral 
Methods,” Econometrica 37: 424-38. 
 
Greenspan, A. and J. Kennedy (2008), “Sources and Uses of Equity Extracted from Homes,” 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 24: 120-44. 
 
Grydaki, M. and D. Bezemer (2013), “The Role of Credit in the Great Moderation: A 
Multivariate GARCH Approach,” Journal of Banking and Finance, in press. 
 
Guerron-Quintana, P. (2009), “Money Demand Heterogeneity and the Great Moderation,” 
Journal of Monetary Economics 56: 255-66. 
 
Iacoviello, M. (2005), “House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy in the 
Business Cycle”, American Economic Review, 95: 739-64. 
 
Jaimovich, N. and H. Siu (2009), “The Young, the Old, and the Restless: Demographics and 
Business Cycle Volatility,” American Economic Review 99: 804–26. 
 
Jermann, U. and V. Quadrini (2006), “Financial Innovations and Macroeconomic Volatility,” 
NBER Working Paper No. 12308. 
 
Jorda, O., M. Schularick and A. Taylor (2012), “When Credit Bites Back: Leverage, Business 
Cycles, and Crises,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper No. 2011-27. 
35 
 
Kahn, J., M. McConnell and G. Perez-Quiros (2002), “On the causes of the increased stability of 
the U.S. economy,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review 8: 183-202. 
 
Kemme, D. and S. Roy (2012), “Did the Recent Housing Boom Signal the Global Financial 
Crisis?,” Southern Economic Journal 78: 999-1018. 
 
Kim, C. and C. Nelson (1999), “Has the U.S. Become More Stable? A Bayesian Approach Based 
on a Markov-Switching Model of the Business Cycle,” Review of Economics and Statistics 
81: 08-16. 
 
Kiyotaki, N. and J. Moore (1997), “Credit Cycles,” Journal of Political Economy 105: 211-48. 
Krippner, G. (2005), “The Financialization of the American Economy,” Socio-Economic Review 
3.2:173-208. 
 
Kwiatkowski, D., P Phillips, P. Schmidt and Y. Shin (1992), “Testing the Null Hypothesis of 
Stationarity against the Alternative of a Unit Root,” Journal of Econometrics 53: 159-78. 
 
Larrain, B. (2006), “Do Banks Affect the Level and Composition of Industrial Volatility?,” The 
Journal of Finance 61: 1897–925. 
 
Lazonick, W. (2011), “The Innovative Enterprise and the Developmental State: Toward an 
Economics of Organizational Success,” Institute for New Economic Thinking Annual 2011 
Conference, Bretton Woods, NH April 8-11. 
 
Levine, R. (2004), “Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence,” Handbook of Economic 
Growth, Aghion, P. and S. Durlauf (eds.), Amsterdam, Elsevier. 
 
Lubik, T., and F. Schorfheide (2003), “Computing Sunspot Equilibria in Linear Rational 
Expectations Models,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 28: 273-85. 
 
36 
 
Mateut, S. (2005), “Trade credit and monetary policy transmission,” Journal of Economic 
Surveys 19: 655-70. 
 
McCarthy, J. and E. Zakrajsek (2007), “Inventory Dynamics and Business Cycles: What Has 
Changed?,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 39: 591-613. 
 
McConnell, M. and G. Perez-Quiros (2000), “Output Fluctuations in the United States: What 
Has Changed since the Early 1980’s,” American Economic Review 90: 1464-76.  
 
Mendicino, A. (2007), “Credit Market and Macroeconomic Volatility,” European Central Bank 
Working Paper No. 743. 
 
Minsky, H. (1982), Can “It” Happen Again?: Essays on Instability and Finance, M.E. Sharpe, 
Armonk, N.Y. 
 
Nakov, A. and A. Pescatori (2010), “Oil and the Great Moderation,” The Economic Journal 120: 
131-56. 
 
Nelson, D. (1991), “Conditional Heteroskedasticity in Asset Returns: A New Approach,” 
Econometrica 59: 347-70. 
 
Nelson, D. and C. Cao (1992), “Inequality Constraints in the Univariate GARCH Model,” 
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 10: 229-35. 
 
Owyang, M.T., J. Piger and H. Wall (2007), “A State-Level Analysis of the Great Moderation,” 
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, Working Paper No. 003B. 
 
Phillips, P. and P. Perron (1988), “Testing for a Unit Root in Time Series Regression,” 
Biometrika Trust 75: 335-46. 
 
37 
 
Primiceri, G. (2005), “Time Varying Structural Vector Autoregressions and Monetary Policy,” 
The Review of Economic Studies 72: 821-52. 
 
Reinhart, C. M. and K. S. Rogoff (2009), This Time It’s Different: Eight Centuries of Financial 
Folly, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Schularick, M. and A. Taylor (2012), “Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage 
Cycles, and Financial Crises, 1870-2008,” American Economic Review 102: 1029-61. 
 
Sims, C. (1980), “Macroeconomic and Reality,” Econometrica 48: 1-48. 
 
Sims, C. and T. Zha (2006), “Were There Regime Switches in U.S. Monetary Policy?,” 
American Economic Review 96: 54-81. 
 
Stock, J. and M. Watson (2002), “Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?,” NBER Working 
Paper No. 9127. 
 
Warnock, M. and F. Warnock (2000), “The Declining Volatility of U.S. Employment: Was 
Arthur Burns Right?,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International 
Finance Discussion Paper No. 677. 
 
Zakoian, J-M. (1994), “Threshold Heteroskedastic Models,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control 18: 931-55. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
